to dismiss him. Perhaps the truest objection to Turner, and the one most often spoken and unspoken, was best expressed in a study of the Midwest where the authors wrote: "We need our own story.''38 As an iconoclast, Turner would not find that idea objectionable. As he wrote, and put in italics, in his essay on "The Significance of History": after all "Each age writes the history of the past anew with reference to the conditions uppermost in its own time." 
Turner's interpretation; but neither challenger has so captured the public mind.2 Hartz's argument for pervasive liberalism proved to be a period piece heavily influenced by the solid anti-communist front of the 1950s as well as that era's vanilla image of Americans as "Ike"-voting, "Lucy"-watching, middle-class conformists. Hartz's liberal consensus position, which had always strained to explain away the Civil War, easily was shattered by the contentious decade of the 1960s, with its raucous challenge to established mores.3 Beard's economic-conflict thesis, fully articulated by 1930, has demonstrated considerably more staying power among historians. Many active scholars, led by those on the political left, still emphasize economic struggle and class conflict as the chief sources of creative tension in American history.4 But if modified Beardian interpretations remain visible in American historiography after more than half a century, his influence has always been felt primarily within the academy. The larger reading public remains almost instinctively resistant to any suggestion that their history has been riddled with class conflict. It is hardly surprising that when Americans seek inspiration from their past that they would turn to the cautious progressive, Turner, rather than to the radical Beard.7 After all, if Walt Whitman was the poet laureate of American democracy, Frederick Jackson Turner was its first professional court historian. But perhaps more importantly, there is arguably something about Turner and his frontier thesis, inspired as it was by the twilight years of the nineteenth century, that speaks directly to our condition in the waning years of the twentieth.
The normally optimistic Turner wrote his celebrated frontier essay in an odd moment of anxiety, as he fretted over a casual observation by a census bureau official that the 1890 enumeration revealed no discernible outer boundary of settlement, no legitimate "frontier."8 Turner worried that the passing of the frontier marked a point of no return in the steady purchase of urbanization and industrialization on the essentially agrarian republic of the nineteenth century. He feared that the Jeffersonian ideals of the family-farm yeomanry were being sacrificed on the altar of industrial capitalism by Wall Street's high priests of finance. Moreover, even though the nation's population was overwhelmingly rural when Turner was born in 1861, it had become nearly half urban by the time he wrote his frontier essay, and by 1920, when Turner published a book of essays reprinting his much acclaimed frontier piece, a majority of the American people lived in urban areas. As small-farm America disappeared, Turner, an affectionate son of the middle border, saw his worst nightmare realized: a cramped, crowded, "Europeanized" America that was losing its distinctiveness. With the budding Populist revolt of the 1890s providing unmistakable background noise, the provincial Turner wrote his frontier essay to warn of impending decline.9
Late twentieth-century Americans labor under a surprisingly similar anxiety. The United States' modern self-image as a powerful industrial behemoth, a nation with "big shoulders," is being tried sorely by the enervating competition of a new global economy. The apparent decline of heavy industry, the flow of jobs overseas, and a per capita income that has fallen out of the world's top dozen have sparked fears about the coming post-industrial order that closely parallel the fears Americans of the 1890s felt about the emerging industrial order. Moreover, the winding down of America's industrial century has been marked by a demographic shift that parallels the rapid urbanization of the late nineteenth century. In the 1990s, for the first time, the majority of Americans are neither rural nor urban but suburban. Just as the alleged closing of the western frontier signaled Turner that the agrarian republic was losing out to urban, industrial society, deindustrialization and the movement of people to the crabgrass frontier suggest to many late twentieth-century Americans the disconcerting arrival of new, post-industrial, suburban society.10
This angst of the post-modern era informs our moment for reviewing Turner's old arguments on behalf of American exceptionalism, and particularly his contention that the frontier served as the "sociocultural furnace" in which American democracy was forged." In recent decades, two identifiable trends in American historiography have borne more or less directly on Turner's "frontier democracy" hypothesis. One of these trends involves the rapidly proliferating body of literature labeled as the "new social history" and the "new economic history." These studies employ an array of analytical tech- niques and computerized data bases, borrowed from the social sciences, to study migration patterns, social mobility, wealth distribution, and class structure. These methodologically sophisticated approaches have produced a number of detailed studies of nineteenthcentury communities, regions, and social groups and facilitated the first rigorous empirical testing of Turner's safety-valve argument.12 The other historiographical trend that is especially relevant to any reassessment of Turner's thesis is the recent flurry of state, local, and regional studies of political culture during the American middle period. These studies, heavily influenced by the "republican synthesis" that reshaped our understanding of revolutionary era politics during the 1970s, pay special attention to issues such as suffrage and representation, and hence shed important new light on the social forces driving political democratization in antebellum America.13 The recent wealth of scholarship using the methods of the "new social" or "new economic" history still begs for coherent synthesis, but on balance this literature suggests that if "frontier democracy" meant anything like social or economic equality, or even rough equality of opportunity, then western reality fell far short of the Turnerian ideal. As a rule on the American frontier, from Ohio and Tennessee westward to California, settlement was followed quickly by the emer- gence of powerful local elites, often composed of successful land speculators who quickly stamped their influence on their locale. Some members of these elites were self-made men, but most drew heavily on family wealth and connections back in the East.14 Upward mobility rates in frontier areas as different as Chillicothe, Ohio, in the early 1800s and San Francisco in the 1850s suggest a degree of opportunity only slightly greater than that available in long-established eastern cities, and if opportunity to move up was slightly greater in frontier towns than eastern cities, so too was the possibility of going broke.15
The boom or bust economies of frontier towns so frightened newly formed elites that fierce competition among aspiring banking and mercantile leaders often grudgingly gave way to a spirit of voluntary cooperation. acknowledged the futility of eliminating such conflict, but they embraced the idea of containing these conflicts within acceptable boundaries as the key to social stability and economic growth.
The instruments for controlling inevitable conflict, according to Doyle, were the civic, religious, and political institutions that eventually came to dominate frontier towns. These churches, political parties, and business clubs served to institutionalize conflict, thereby diverting sectarian disputes, political grudges, and business rivalries into channels where rational, if heated, debate displaced violent physical assault. These voluntary institutions, Doyle emphasizes, did not eliminate conflict so much as routinize it, but in so doing they provided venues and organizations through which like-minded members of frontier communities pursued common goals. Thus frontier towns were sustained not by the individual self-assertion celebrated by Turner nor by the neighborly cooperation touted by his early critics, but by the rapid evolution of the unglamorous social bureaucracies of churches, schools, civic clubs, and political parties. If frontier towns defined American democracy, then the latter is better understood as the product of pious "joiners," sociable women, and "clubable" middle-class men than the heroic egalitarians of Turner's imagined Even if the frontier did not produce an egalitarian distribution of wealth, recent scholarship suggests that prospects for upward mobility were reasonably good in antebellum America, and especially good on the frontier. Life-cycle models of wealth accumulation presume that households grow wealthier as their heads grow older, with accumulation levelling off as the head approaches "retirement" age. Such models neatly explain the economic career of the typical antebellum rural white American.22 Roughly two thirds of rural antebellum householders owned land (though the percentage varied widely from locale to locale and may have been slightly lower in the plantation South than elsewhere), and the majority of landless householders were young tenants whose chances were reasonably good for acquiring land as they grew older.23
Throughout the antebellum era, this "agricultural ladder" remained a viable instrument for upward social mobility in both the North and South. Young tenants, lacking capital and perhaps expertise, worked as renters for several years until profit, inheritance, or propitious marriage allowed them to purchase land. In the rural North, for instance, over 60 percent of all tenant farmers were under age forty. While over 23 percent of young farm operators (under the age of twenty-five) were tenants, fewer than 7 percent of those over age 50 still worked on rented farms.24 A similar pattern held in the rural South, where over 60 percent of all tenants had yet to reach age tially higher per capita income and a slightly faster rate of growth between 1840 and 1860 than did the region closer to the frontier, which experienced a 250 percent increase in population during the era. In fact, per capita incomes in the industrializing Northeast were nearly twice as high as those of the agricultural Northwest in both 1840 and 1860. In macroeconomic terms at least, northerners who left the industrial Northeast for the frontier moved from an area of high but very unevenly distributed incomes to an area of significantly lower but somewhat more evenly distributed earnings. In the face of this evidence, the massive relocation of northerners to the free-state frontier appears, on the surface, to represent a curious shift from a high-income area to a lower-income area. But a balanced assessment of the impact of the free-soil frontier on the antebellum northern economy requires an exercise in counterfactual history. Without the frontier as an economic "safety-valve," it is doubtful that the Northeast could have absorbed the large numbers of foreign immigrants it received during the 1840s and 1850s and still maintained its high level of personal income. Thus the frontier probably helped sustain antebellum northern prosperity even if it was not that region's engine of economic growth. Of course, if frontier land had not been available, it is possible that the antebellum North, like the antebellum South, would have attracted relatively few immigrants. In that case, income growth for native-born northerners might have been impressive despite the lack of cheap land, but the character of the nation as a whole, without the immigration, would have been altered dramatically. 26 Taken together, these studies of individual social mobility and aggregate economic development reveal that antebellum America was a land of remarkable economic opportunity, and that, as Turner hypothesized, the frontier did much to enhance that opportunity.27 In the South, the continued presence of a cotton frontier drove the region's impressive growth. In the North, the dynamics of growth owed more to the bustling commerce and budding manufacturing system of the Northeast than the frontier bread-basket, but the presence of the frontier facilitated northern growth even if it was not its primary cause. Yet for many antebellum Americans, economic well-being probably was not measured in terms of income levels (which were generally improving) or wealth distribution (which was generally worsening), but of personal or household independence. The foundation of independence was ownership and control of productive property, and thus land ownership was often considered a better measure of economic status than income. An impressive outpouring of literature that often disagrees on other matters supports that the notion that, above all else, antebellum Americans loathed the dependence of propertyless wage laborers.28 And they were generally successful, in the short run, in avoiding what modern scholars, following Marx, call "proletarianization," because the frontier eased the way to property ownership with its abundant and relatively cheap land.29 In doing so, the frontier "safety-valve" undoubtedly helped sustain the Jeffersonian ideal of independence, much as Turner maintained a century ago.
In recent decades, a number of scholars have argued that politics, not the frontier, served as the true "safety-valve" in American life. The United States, the argument goes, was the only modern induspoint out that cliometric work probably overstates the case for upward mobility since it tends to focus on those who "persist" over time in the same locale. These "persisters," it is argued, likely fared better on the average that their more mobile one-time neighbors, who moved often because of their lack of economic success. But even if recent works overstate the case for general upward mobility in antebellum America, the data provides almost incontrovertible proof that there was enough genuine upward mobility to sustain the popular perception of America, and its frontier, as a land of unique opportunity. trial nation to experience its democratic revolution before its industrial revolution. As a result, its comparatively inclusive politics muted social antagonism by directing them into legitimate political channels.30 While Turner never offered such an argument, he asserted vehemently that political democracy was central to American distinctiveness, and that the frontier, more than anything else, fostered democracy. Turner's insistence on this point has been one of the most vigorously disputed aspects of his thesis. Yet recent historiography has fundamentally restructured our understanding of the meaning of "democracy" in its early national and Jacksonian contexts. Political "democracy," as it was understood through much of the antebellum era, was not a full-blown political creed but rather a crucial component in the larger ideology of republicanism. Republican ideology was part of nineteenth-century America's political and intellectual inheritance from the revolutionary era, and arguably the greatest achievement of the republican founders was their embrace of popular sovereignty, the idea that the ultimate political authority lay with the "people," rather than with a king, an aristocracy, or a supreme Parliament. At the same time, many early Americans feared majoritarian tyranny and democratic excess. The nation envisioned by the founders was not a democracy where simple majorities ruled but a republic whose structure incorporated elaborate checks and balances that could stymie renegade majorities as well as other threats to individual liberty. Moreover, the founders insisted that the success of their republican experiment hinged on the maintenance of a social order where the widespread ownership of productive property sustained an independent citizenry.36
In theory, at least, the popular political ideologies of the Jacksonian era continued to cherish independence and fear concentrated power, even that of majorities. But, in practice, within the larger lan- York 1990) , esp. 39-58. Freehling applies this dichotomy only to the antebellum South. I believe that, with appropriate adjustments for regional diversity, it is a distinction that works reasonably well for the republic as whole during the early national and Jacksonian years. cific trade skills as their "property," their source of independence, and in much of the South and Old Northwest, mere whiteness of skin seemed to qualify men as independent. These more generous, more inclusive definitions of independence tacitly permitted a fairly thorough democratization of antebellum political culture while leaving the most cherished of republican ideals theoretically intact. Americans continued to embrace "independence" as the essence of republican citizenship even as the prerequisites for independence were significantly redefined.39
If the frontier was only one of many factors which played a role in democratizing the political culture of American republicanism, it was clearly a crucial factor in sustaining a republican social order in the face of the "Market Revolution" that followed the War of 1812.40 As Drew McCoy has emphasized, the availability of abundant western land allowed the young republic to grow economically by expanding through space, producing an ever larger agricultural surplus for market, rather than by developing over time, seeking profit through the intensification of commerce and industrialization. Because of the frontier, the republic sustained a huge and growing population of yeoman freeholders, while others (tenants and farm laborers) held a reasonable expectation of becoming yeoman freeholders, and still others (artisans and mechanics) identified themselves as the "yeomanry of the city." By slowing the process of proletarianization in pre-Civil War America, the frontier permitted egalitarian republicanism, with its insistence on independence as the basis for citizenship, to postpone for a generation its direct confrontation with the market revolution, industrialization, and a large, dependent working class.41
The role of the frontier as a "safety-valve" that allowed the republic to postpone crises by diffusing them across space has become a recurrent a theme in recent historical writing. Perhaps the most pro- these controversies over Missouri, Texas, California, and Kansas all were settled, albeit with escalating difficulty, by compromise. The controversy over slavery in the territories often precipitated sectional crises during the antebellum era, yet the territories themselves were the safety-valve which prevented the show-down over slavery from occurring much earlier in the republic's history.48 King Cotton coveted virgin land, and the frontier provided it. Proletarianization threatened the North's dynamic free-labor economy, but competition from newly settled areas encouraged outmigration from the older rural areas of the North. The "hidden depression" of the 1850s, which drove many former artisans and mechanics into wage labor just as the massive post-1848 wave of foreign immigration glutted the market, only served to make the situation more volatile. Therefore, the frontier loomed larger than ever in the minds of white northerners seeking a "safety-valve" to avoid dependency. 49 The Republican party's rallying cry of "free soil, free labor, free men" assumed a new ring of urgency, and pressure to ban slave competition from all territories intensified. Many northerners worried that the fabled upward mobility that Abraham Lincoln celebrated as the "right to rise" might be jeopardized permanently. Thus, despite impressive macroeconomic growth and rising personal incomes, Americans, North and South, were haunted by fears that their status as independent householders and their prospects for upward mobility were threatened unless they enjoyed continued access to the frontier.50 By the late 1850s, in both regions, ideas about independence and opportunity had grown inextricably tied to the frontier, and the controversy over free or slave labor-essentially a question of equal access to the frontier-proved the proximate cause of secession and Civil War.
Had the opportunity for parallel expansion across the shared frontier not existed, had not abundant land served as some kind of safetyvalve for both North and South, it seems probable that the inherent contradictions between republican ideas and the material reality of both the slave and free labor economies would have been exposed much earlier, producing serious internal crises in both regions. These earlier crises, coming before the democratic revolution had extended full political rights to virtually all white men and established democratic politics as the realm of conflict resolution in the United States, might well have prompted what Barrington Moore has described as a reactionary coalition between northern capitalists and southern planters. This conservative coalition of propertied elites might have worked to stunt the evolution of political democracy and guide the republic down the repressive "Prussian Road" to industrial modernity.51 Without the yeomanry of the frontier to draw upon, resistance to this reactionary coalition would have likely pushed upward from below, from hard-pressed artisans and the emerging working class, perhaps with some petty bourgeois assistance, in a kind of crude American approximation of the failed European revolutions of 1848.52 Instead, the frontier delayed the crisis, giving the democratic revolution time to take hold and allowing the plain folk of both North and South time to identify prospects for continued independence and opportunity with the existence of the frontier. By the time the sectional tensions reached new heights late in the 1850s, the democratic revolution-which the frontier aided but did not cause-had done its work. The capitalists of the North knew it was free-soilers and workers they must placate and not southern slaveholders. Southern planters knew it was the tenaciously independent plain folk, not Yankee entrepreneurs, whom they must convince to sustain slavery. Neither propertied elite saw a reactionary alliance as a viable option in the face of intense political pressures from their respective beleaguered yeomanries.53 The defining struggle of nineteenth-century America was not 
